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no
USSR-Guinea: The USSR's speedy recognition of Guinea on 4 October, despite France's desire that recognition be withheld during a two-month transitional period of negotiations between France and Guinea, is intended to support Moscow's pose as champion of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia. The USSR is likely to press for exchange of diplomatic representatives and to offer economic assistance to Guinea in lieu of further French aid--which De Gaulle has indicated would cease--in the hope of strengthening existing tendencies within the new state toward neutralist, anti-Western policies.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK
Greece-Cyprus: Intensive activity continues within the Greek Government prior to the 6 October meeting of the North Atlantic Council to discuss the Spaak proposals for a conference on the Cyprus issue. Premier Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff are seeking a "face-saving" formula which will permit Greece

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DAILY BRIEF

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to participate in the conference. King Paul and Greek military leaders are firmly opposed to Averoff's previous suggestion that Greece withdraw from NATO and break relations with Britain and Turkey. A "tactical" resignation by Karamanlis, allowing him to reorganize his government and probably to include a new foreign minister, remains a possibility. [REDACTED]

OK
Morocco: Vice Premier Bouabid, left-wing leader who apparently is wielding a growing influence in the Moroccan Government, revealed a somewhat more flexible attitude during a recent discussion of the American air bases and indicated that it might be possible to reach an accord along mutually acceptable lines. Nevertheless, the Moroccan press continues to urge the immediate evacuation of the bases.

LATE ITEM

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*Taiwan: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 6 October "firmly advised" Vice Admiral Smoot that Peiping's temporary ceasefire offer is designed to catch the United States with its guard down and to drive a wedge between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists. Chiang said he is "absolutely and unalterably opposed" to any change in present courses of action. [REDACTED]

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The Greek Government and Cyprus

The Greek Government is examining its own future and Greece's relations with the West in the light of the Cyprus issue. Foreign Minister Averoff continues to advocate a strong policy in the controversy, including, if necessary, disengagement from Greece's NATO ties and the breaking of relations with Britain and Turkey. Military leaders in Greece, however, oppose any weakening or temporary severance of Greek ties with NATO over the Cyprus dispute, and King Paul apparently is determined that his country will not withdraw from the organization.

Meanwhile, the government is continuing to examine the latest Spaak proposals for a conference to discuss the British plan for Cyprus. Greek Delegate Melas will present the Greek position on the proposed conference at the 6 October meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Clarification of the role of the Turkish representative on Cyprus--provided for under the British plan--has tended to reduce Greek opposition to that provision. Athens, however, continues to insist that a "permanent" solution to the Cyprus problem should be accepted--a proposal basically in conflict with British insistence that only an "interim" solution be discussed at this time. Greek leaders, while somewhat restricted by the necessity to coordinate action with Archbishop Makarios, have continued to search for some formula which would permit their attendance at the proposed conference.

Resignation of the Karamanlis government remains a possibility if no progress toward a Cyprus solution is made in the forthcoming NAC meetings. A tactical resignation by Karamanlis, followed by a new mandate from the King, would permit him to reorganize his cabinet and possibly gradually adopt a new course in foreign policy. Foreign Minister Averoff, frequently at odds with Karamanlis and other members of the cabinet in recent weeks, might be dropped through such a maneuver.

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Moroccan Vice Premier Reveals Flexible Attitude
On American Air Bases

Moroccan Vice Premier Abderrahim Bouabid revealed on 2 October an attitude regarding the American air bases apparently somewhat more flexible than that of Premier Balafrej. Bouabid--the only representative of Istiqlal party extremists in the government and seemingly slated to wield growing influence within the regime--indicated that an agreement might be possible along the lines of the American proposal of 10 September for a seven-year agreement. He suggested that a public statement of the American position might relieve popular pressure on the government and create a favorable climate for concluding an agreement. Such a statement, he added, would also serve to persuade France and Spain "to move forward on the evacuation question since they are at present simply marking time until they see how we come out."

Since early this summer the Moroccan press, largely edited by extreme nationalists seeking enlarged representation in the government, has clamored for the evacuation of the five American air bases as well as the withdrawal of French and Spanish military forces which now number 33,000 and 17,000 respectively. In an effort to maintain control over the government, the Istiqlal moderates under the leadership of Premier Balafrej have largely adopted policies advocated by the extremists. Balafrej has indicated that his government was considering an agreement permitting nonstrategic use of the bases for two or three years. He expected to make his government's formal reply by early this week.

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Algerian Rebels Threaten to Embroil Tunisia and Morocco

Spokesmen for the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic have stated that the rebel regime is attempting to establish indirect contact with the French Government with the view of entering into eventual negotiations. Informal contacts reportedly existed between Algerian "premier" Ferhat Abbas and De Gaulle prior to the proclamation of the rebel regime on 19 September, but may have been broken off.

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The rebel regime apparently has postponed a decision on the location of its seat of government. Bourguiba has refused the rebels' request to establish it in Tunisia, but informal arrangements are being made to locate various "ministries" in Tunisia and Morocco while a nominal main office will be maintained in Cairo. Abbas and three of the four most prominent military leaders of cabinet rank would probably establish themselves in Tunisia. Plans to appoint Algerian ambassadors to several capitals, including Rabat and Tunis, have been dropped for the present and other plans are reported suspended until the Arab League establishes a budget for the regime. Early last month the Algerians sought \$33,000,000 from the league.

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